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Ecology in Beckett’s Theatre Garden: Or How to Cultivate the Oikos 
 
In an Introduction, co-written with my colleague and friend Clare 
Finburgh, for the publication Rethinking the Theatre of the Absurd: Ecology, 
Environment and the Greening of the Modern Stage (2015), I suggested that the 
work of the playwrights loosely associated with Martin Esslin’s problematic 
category, the Theatre of the Absurd, might be rethought historically rather than 
existentially. This led me to claim that so-called absurdist writers (whose names 
include Samuel Beckett, Eugène Ionesco, Arthur Adamov, Jean Genet and Harold 
Pinter) were able to articulate a ‘structure of historical feeling’,1 in Raymond 
Williams’ understanding of the term, that was characterised by a nascent but 
deeply felt sense of anxiety regarding an impending form of ecological crisis.2 In 
my reading, the anxiety was dependent upon two factors. First, the explosion of 
the two atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, quickly 
followed by the invisible terrors of radiation sickness, cancers, and birth defects 
in the bodies of survivors; and second, the appearance of new modes of 
ecological knowledge that came into being in the 1950s, and which were 
popularised by Rachel Carson’s eco-best-seller, Silent Spring (1962), a text that 
highlighted the disastrous effects of chemical pesticides on bird populations as 
                                                        
1 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), pp. 128-35. 
2 Carl Lavery and Clare Finburgh ‘Introduction: Greening the Absurd’, in 
Rethinking the Theatre of the Absurd: Ecology, Environment and the ‘Greening’ of 
the Modern Stage, ed. by Carl Lavery and Clare Finburgh (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015), pp. 1-58 (pp.16-17).  
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well as on the larger ecosystem in general. The great irony, here, of course, is 
that many of the playwrights associated with the Theatre of the Absurd, in 
particular Samuel Beckett, rejected naturalist depictions of history altogether. 
Paradoxically, by deliberately constructing his work so that it could occupy what 
philosopher Peter Osborne, after Gilles Deleuze, has called ‘any-space-
whatever’,3 Beckett has arguably proved the most historically astute and 
adaptable of all twentieth-century playwrights; the one whose work 
foreshadows, darkly, the general and specific dilemmas of our own 
environmentally troubled age, the playwright who, to use Alan Read’s language, 
continues to irritate us, having the ability to get under our skin.4  
But what does this irritation consist of, and why does it affect us in the 
age of what many geologists and climate scientists are now calling the 
Anthropocene, a new geological epoch in which western modernity has 
embedded itself, into the very rock strata of the planet as a result of 
industrialisation, nuclear testing and the burning of fossil fuels?5 Possibly 
because, as I wager in this article, Beckett’s plays purposefully set out to 
deconstruct the teleological triumphalism inherent in some narratives about the 
Anthropocene. In Beckett’s hands, theatre is no longer a space where the essence 
                                                        
3 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art 
(London: Verso, 2013), p. 149. 
4 Alan Read, Theatre in the Expanded Field: Seven Approaches to Performance 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. xix. 
5 As well as changing the geomorphology of the earth through drilling and 
excavation practices, the industrial processes of capitalist modernity have 
increased the amount of carbon in the atmosphere and so warmed the planet, 
which, in turn, has impacted on tectonic plate movements. They have also left 
trace elements in sand, rock, and soils through toxic sludge and other forms of 
chemical pollution. Even the most remote places on earth, areas once designated 
as wilderness, now show signs of human interference through the presence of 
airborne particles in soil sediments. 
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of the human appears; on the contrary, it is a site where the human dis-appears, 
subjected, as it is, to a series of ‘more than human’ flows and temporal processes 
that challenge its much-vaunted exceptionalism and apparent omniscience. To 
be a spectator at a Beckett play is to find oneself overwhelmed by the 
shimmering presence of a strange and estranging world, a world that no longer 
makes linguistic sense, and where the dangerous binary between ‘nature’ and 
culture is troubled, without, for all that, ever being dissolved completely.6 
In order to unearth the ecological potential that remains latent in the 
temporal and affective aspects of Beckett’s work, I propose, in this article, to 
adopt an oblique method of approach. Instead of engaging in direct analysis, in 
simply displaying the textual evidence for my claims and parcelling out 
knowledge, I intend to read Beckett’s theatre indirectly through the metaphor of 
a garden. The reason behind this figural move is to find a new way of engaging 
with the ecological affects of Beckett’s theatre, the sense in which, as in a garden, 
actors and spectators are subjected to a kind of ‘weathering’, to the elemental 
impress of time. The overall objective is to offer an alternative approach to the 
ecological dimension of Beckett’s theatre that draws on two, as of yet, divergent 
strands of contemporary Beckett scholarship – namely, the ecocritical and the 
phenomenological or haptic. Additionally, I am concerned with how we might 
write ecological affect in response to Beckett’s plays, a stylistic ambition that 
necessitates a different form of theatre criticism by experimenting with a 
subjective register of discourse. For if, as I argue below, Beckett’s work insists on 
                                                        
6 This attempt to undo binaries and exclusions resonates with Bruno Latour’s 
critique of modernity in We Have Never Been Modern, trans. by Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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a mode of embodied participation, in which spectators are included in the event, 
the only way to capture the affective charge of that experience in writing is to 
fashion metaphors, images and rhythms as much as ideas, concepts and 
terminologies. 
Ecology 
 Given its relative marginality, to date, within the disciplines of Theatre 
and Performance Studies, it seems important, from the outset, to qualify my 
comments on ecology, and to define how I seek to use it in conjunction with 
Beckett’s theatre. The first point to note is that ecology is not necessarily about 
‘nature’ (whatever that means) and neither is it limited to a scientific or 
cybernetic study of a given ecosystem or communication network.7 Rather, as I 
use it, ecology is a mode of operating that seeks connections, and which attempts 
to problematise, without ever collapsing, the borders between the human and 
non-human, the socius and bios.8 Ecology then is a marginal discourse by itself, a 
discourse of the in-between, the composite: it fluctuates, swerves, and troubles. 
Crucially, it is also a discourse about what it means to be at home. In its 
etymology, for instance, ecology is a word that derives from the combination of 
the Greek prefix oikos (home, house or hearth) with the suffix logos (law, order, 
economy). In a literal sense, then, to be ecological is to engage in what the eco-
                                                        
7 This is close to Timothy Morton’s argument in Ecology Without Nature: 
Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007). It also explains why nature in this article is always placed in inverted 
commas. 
8 For more on how ecological thinking is a thinking of connection, see Timothy 
Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), p. 1. 
5 
 
critic and poet Wendell Berry calls ‘home economics’,9 a practice that would, 
from Berry’s perspective at least, privilege planning, the management of supply 
and demand, and the return to equilibrium - all things that policy makers and 
government think-tanks are so concerned to quantify and centralise. 
 While I want to keep the etymological link that would tie ecology to a 
thinking about home and homecoming in this article, my understanding and 
usage of the term differs, quite radically, from Berry’s; and we could say, for that 
matter, from much of the first wave of ecocritical writing, which relied heavily on 
Heideggerian notions of dwelling and homecoming. In my understanding, by 
contrast, ecology is a mode of operating that troubles the contours of the human 
subject by revealing the extent to which the entwined concepts of homecoming 
and dwelling are not only philosophically dubious but environmentally and 
socially harmful. This is because such thinking tends to place the subject at the 
very centre of the world by assuming that the human being is the only creature 
that can dwell poetically.10 There is nothing, for instance, in Heidegger’s 
discourse of dwelling to suggest that the earth has its own autonomy, and/or 
that ‘nature’ is something that dominates us as opposed to being something that 
we are charged to care for. Ultimately, an ecology founded on a dwelling-
perspective is unable to respect the alterity of the earth, the fact that it does not 
exist for ‘us’, so to speak. Additionally, such a philosophy offers little help in 
allowing us to live in a world that very obviously and directly questions human 
                                                        
9 Wendell Berry, Home Economics: Fourteen Essays (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 
1987), pp. 54-75. 
10 In this context, see Carl Lavery and Simon Whitehead’s critique of 
Heideggerian-inspired eco-criticism, ‘Bringing It All Back Home: Towards an 
Ecology of Place’, Performance Research, 17: 4 (2012), 111-19. 
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supremacy, such as we saw, for example, in the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 or 
the earthquake in Haiti in 2010.  The difficulty with an ecology of dwelling is that 
it can transform, quickly, into an ecology of despair and rage in those moments 
when the world refuses to play a subservient role in the human drama. 
Instead then of an ecology that surreptitiously seeks to master the earth, I want 
to argue for an oikology that undoes the human subject by placing it – the 
anthropos - in an immanent world that it is unable to dominate. From this 
perspective, homecoming, the search for the oikos, would be a paradoxical 
process, something that is doomed, in advance, to failure, a realisation that 
human being, contra its designated place in western metaphysics, is always a 
deferred or impossible being. In ecological terms - and this is why Beckett’s work 
is so important - there might be more to be learnt in accepting our absence than 
in clinging to our presence.    
My understanding of ecology draws much from the thinking of Jean-
François Lyotard who, in his late work - especially the collection of essays The 
Inhuman: Reflections on Time (1992) – posited the oikos as something that was 
fundamentally opposed to economic and cybernetic systems as well as to 
metaphysical values.11 Playing on the etymological root that links ecology with 
economics (oikonimikos or oikonomikon), and which he associates with the 
‘public sphere’, Lyotard proceeds to offer an unconventional and ontological 
reading of the oikos that emphasises its strangeness, privacy and resistance to 
communication: 
                                                        
11 For a reading of Harold’s Pinter drama through Lyotard’s notion of the oikos, 
see Mark Taylor-Batty and Carl Lavery, ‘The Secluded Voice: The Impossible Call 
Home in Early Pinter’, in Rethinking The Theatre of Absurd, ed. by Lavery and 
Finburgh, pp. 219-40. 
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I simply mean that, for me, ‘ecology’ means the discourse of the secluded, 
of the thing that has not become public, that has not become 
communicational, that has not become systemic, and that can never be 
any of these things.12 
 For Lyotard, the oikos is absolutely not a place where one can dwell; it 
lies beyond representation and cognition as a shadow, a secret, something 
working away at the centre of identity, undoing it, making us marginal to 
ourselves: 
My oikeion is an otherness that is not an Umwelt at all, but this otherness 
is in the core of the apparatus. We have to imagine an apparatus inhabited 
by a sort of guest, not a ghost, but an ignored guest who produces some 
trouble, and people look to the outside to find out the external cause of 
the trouble. But probably the cause is not outside at all. […] That is the 
reason why I connect…this topic of the oikeion with a writing that is not 
knowledge at all and that has, properly speaking, no function. 13 
 
To be ecological in a progressive sense, Lyotard believes, is not, then, in the first 
instance, to turn towards the Umwelt or outside environment. On the contrary, it 
centres on the human being’s capacity to find a way of living with this internal 
alterity, this ignored guest that troubles us, but which we can never transcend 
because it constitutes the paradoxical core of our humanity. As Lyotard puts it in 
a different text the destiny of ‘humankind…is to be inhabited by the inhuman’. 14 
Lyotard’s understanding of ecology is important. Not only does it problematise 
the utopianism or naivety in most systems-based theories of ecology, in which 
human beings are supposed to renounce their identity with ease, it also undoes 
arrogant ideas about human exceptionalism that one finds in Enlightenment 
                                                        
12 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Oikos’ in Political Writings, trans. by Bill Readings and 
Kevin Paul Geiman (London: UCL Press, 1993), pp 96-107 (p.105). 
13 Ibid, p.102. 
14 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoffrey 
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 2. 
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concepts of subjectivity. For all its similarity with Lacanian notions of the real, 
Lyotard does not believe that one can banish the inhuman from the human.15 On 
the contrary, and paradoxically, the inhuman, for him, forms the core of the 
human, that ‘thing’ within us that links us to ‘nature’ and which transforms 
human existence into an experiment in/with immanence. The inhuman, in other 
words, is a marker of what we might see as our ‘creatureliness’, something which 
ties us to the fate and destiny of the planet itself, and which undoes the absolute 
binary that anthropocentric thinking draws between culture and ‘nature’. 
Lyotard’s theory of ‘nature’ is rooted in division, becoming and bifurcation. As 
opposed to the standard Romantic vision that emerges from Fichte and Hegel, 
there is no possibility, for Lyotard, of ever returning to a fixed origin or of re-
establishing some lost harmony within the natural world. The best we can do is 
to try to accommodate ourselves to the anarchic ‘unhomeliness’ of the oikos, to 
give it a space to emerge. But there is no guarantee of success. Everything 
remains indeterminate and contingent. 
Lyotard’s view of ecology as a way of learning to live with the inhuman, 
both within the world at large and within the structures of subjectivity itself, has 
important consequences for how one might conceive of the ecological value of 
art, and in this specific instance, theatre. For if ecology is about allowing a space 
for irrecuperable strangeness to emerge (if not to speak), then ecological 
artworks have little to do, necessarily, with the representation of ‘nature’ or with 
engaging, directly and actively, in issues to do with environmental justice, such 
                                                        
15 Lacan seeks to do this by positing the human subject as a speaking being, 
someone whose unconscious is always structured like a language, and whose fall 
out of language into the real is synonymous with trauma and psychosis. 
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as climate change, species extinction, sustainability, resilience. On the contrary, 
the most ecologically valid artworks may be those that allow a space for the 
inhuman to appear in the very realm (art) where human existence has 
traditonally been thought to find its most essential expression. 
With regard to theatre, this means renouncing western drama’s 
traditional obsession with reflection, and fashioning, instead, a mode of 
performance that would show spectators not what they are but what they are 
not. In concrete terms, this would be a theatre where Aristotelian dramaturgies, 
with their focus on constructing coherent dramatic actions unfolding in a linear 
pattern towards a designated end or telos, would be replaced with a subtractive 
theatre where time becomes a palpable and problematic force. The point, here, is 
not to represent an action but to create an affective discharge, to engage in what 
we call after Beckett ‘nerve work’.16 For, as Lyotard remarks, the oikos, the 
inhuman, is beyond cognition. We know it because we feel it in our bodies, 
because it touches us, because we are in it, like Lucky’s speech in Waiting for 
Godot (1953) or the buzzing voice in Not I (1972). As such, and from this, I want 
to propose that theatre’s ecological significance resides in the material charge of 
the theatrical medium itself, in the way in which an affective dramaturgical 
sculpting of time and space has the potential to disorder and reorder perception 
to the point where we are able to welcome in the troublesome guest, the oikos. 
This is a theatre, then, like Beckett’s, which, to cite Elinor Fuchs, ‘no longer 
defines itself, spatially, against an unseen outside’, but which is best understood 
                                                        
16 This refers to Beckett’s letter to the actress Jessica Tandy in which he 
explained that Not I is ‘to work on the nerves of the audience, not its intellect.’ 
See Enoch Brater, Beyond Minimalism: Beckett’s Late Style in the Theatre (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 23. 
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as a heterotopia or counter-site whose very presence throws the reality of the 
so-called real world into doubt.17 Which is precisely why I want to think of 
theatre in this essay not so much as a house but as a garden, a milieu in which 
our ‘becoming inhuman’ is cultivated.  
Beckett, Ecocriticism and Ecology 
Such an immanent way of thinking about theatre transforms the way in 
which existing ecological readings of Beckett’s work have tended to proceed, 
even when some of these readings, such as Theodor Adorno’s, predate the arrival 
of ecocriticism on to the critical stage. In his complex 1958 essay ‘Trying To 
Understand Endgame’, Adorno proposes that Beckett’s ecological importance is 
implicitly found in how he critiques ‘the permanent catastrophe’ that humanity 
has inflicted on the planet and on itself during the twentieth century. For 
Adorno, this is due to a constellation of historical events: the Holocaust, the 
development of a nuclear arsenal and ensuing arms race during the Cold War, 
and, in more general terms, by capitalism’s complete reification of the world. In 
Adorno’s view, Beckett shows us what it means to live in a world without nature, 
a world where no seeds sprout, a biosphere in ruins: 
In Beckett, history devours existentialism…. After the Second World War, 
everything is destroyed…; humanity vegetates along, crawling, after 
events which even the survivors cannot really survive, on a pile of ruins 
which even renders futile self-reflection of one’s battered state.18  
                                                        
17 Elinor Fuchs, The Death of Character: Perspectives on Theater After Modernism 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 93. 
18 Theodor Adorno, ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’, trans. by M. T. Jones, New 




The contemporary ecocritic Greg Garrard adopts a similar tone to Adorno, 
but takes a different path, influenced, no doubt, by a fundamental shift in the 
object of environmental anxiety from nuclear catastrophe to climate change. As 
he has it, Endgame (1957) is a perfect play for a culture such as ours that is 
facing the uncertainties of climate change and species extinction. In Garrard’s 
reading, Endgame does not so much foreshadow the end of the world, as point 
towards a world that we are now currently living in, a world where the 
catastrophe has already happened, a world of limited resources that are running 
out, a Malthusian world.  The horror of Endgame then is not about 
disappearance, for Garrard, but about endurance, the terror of living in a 
damaged, lifeless Umwelt where nothing changes or grows, the endless 
recurrence of the same, listless grey black-grey horizon: 
Endgame is literally, though not clearly, about both the end – of nature ‘in 
the vicinity’ of comfort, of kindness, of some semblance of peace or 
equality – and the grim elusiveness of any such reassuring finality…. 
Worse than the thought that ‘it must be nearly finished’ might be the 
hideous actuality of endurance.19 
 The critical readings proposed by Garrard and Adorno 20are certainly in 
tune with Beckett’s own desire to find a ‘form that accommodates the mess’ of 
                                                        
19 Greg Gerrard, ‘Endgame: Beckett’s Ecological Thought’, in Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd’ hui 23, ed. by Yann Méval, Dominique Rabaté and Sjef 
Houpermans (Amsterdam: Rodopoi, 2011), pp. 383-97 (p. 395). 
20 Samuel Beckett in an interview with Tom Driver, 1961, quoted in S.E. 
Gontarski, ‘Introduction: Towards a Minoritarian Criticism – The Questions We 
Ask’ in The Edinburgh Companion to Samuel Beckett and the Arts, ed. by S. E. 
Gontarski (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 1-16 (p. 13). 
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the twentieth century.21 And, it is telling from an ecological perspective, that 
Beckett, perhaps thinking of the Torrey Canyon oil spill off the coast of Cornwall 
in 1967, described Winnie in his 1971 production of Happy Days in Berlin ‘as a 
bird with oil on its feathers’. 22 Arguably, even more so than in Endgame, Happy 
Days (1961), with its burning sun, allusions to fire storms and skin melting,23 as 
well as the key line about the earth losing its ‘atmosphere’, seems to take place in 
a planet without an ozone layer, a planet under threat.24  By deliberately refusing 
to invest in historically specific images, by keeping, that is, things strange and 
nebulous, Beckett appears to predict the environmental chaos that we are in 
today. Winnie’s surreal burial in a patch of scorched earth is revealing, in this 
context. For what the image communicates, albeit silently and evocatively, is the 
dark underside of ‘anthropocene knowledge’ – knowledge that realises, all too 
well, that we are part of and dependent on the earth, no more so, indeed, than 
when we try to transcend it through technology. This contemporary meaning of 
the play is surely what is at stake in the striking scenography of Blandine 
Savetier’s production of the play at the Comédie de Béthune in 2011. Here a 
peroxided Winnie, played by Natalie Royer, is entombed in a mound of black 
polythene bin liners that bring to mind images of the terrible ‘Trash Vortex’, a 
                                                        
21 For other ecocritical readings of Beckett, see Paul Davies. ‘Strange Weather: 
Beckett from the Perspective of Ecocriticism’, in Beckett After Beckett, ed. by S.E. 
Gontarski and Anthony Uhlmann (Gainsville: University of Florida Press 2006), 
pp.  66-78; and Paul Saunders, ‘Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy and the Ecology of 
Negation’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 20: 1 (2011), 54-77. 
22 James Knowlson, ‘Beckett as Director: The Manuscript Notebooks and Critical 
Interpretation’ in Modernism in European Drama: Ibsen, Strindberg, Pirandello, 
Beckett ed. by Christopher Innes and Frederick J. Marker (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998), pp.212-227 (p. 220). 
23 Samuel Beckett, ‘Happy Days’ in Samuel Beckett The Complete Dramatic Works 
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1990), p. 154. All further references to the 
plays will use this source. 
24 Ibid, p. 161. 
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gyre-like garbage dump that circulates endlessly in the middle of the Pacific 
Ocean, and which is composed of man-made plastics and toxic chemicals.25 
Without ever making a direct allusion to the world, the image in Happy Days 
appears to think almost by itself, producing ecological connections and contexts, 
jumping backwards and forwards and to the side, but always, I think, reminding 
us, in some oblique but tangible way, of our interdependency, that there is no 
way of escaping – of exiting –  the world. As Hamm puts it in Endgame: ‘You’re on 
earth, there’s no cure for that’.26 
 These ecological readings of Beckett’s theatre, for all their relevance, 
remain at the level of the symbolic. They alert us to hidden possibilities – 
hermeneutic possibilities - within the dramatic text, and are founded, ultimately, 
on a logic of representation, a sign economy that points to an outside world that 
spectators recognise and make sense of. But what happens if we shift the focus of 
our attention, and think of Beckett’s work not so much in terms of ecological 
hermeneutics but rather as an ecological practice in and by itself? The first point 
to note is how this turn from text to performance, from representation to affect 
resonates with the work of critics such as Anna McMullan (2010), Colin Gardner 
(2012), Trish McTighe (2013), and Stan Gontarski (2015), who, in their different 
ways, are interested in the haptic or sensate quality of Beckett’s plays.27 For 
                                                        
25 The size of the Trash Vortex is open to debate. Some reports believe it to be 
the size of Texas, others contend that it is more comparable to the United States 
of America. 
26 Samuel Beckett, Endgame, p. 118. 
27 Anna McMullan, Performing Embodiment in Samuel Beckett’s Drama (London: 
Routledge, 2010); Colin Gardner, Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event: 
Peephole Art (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Trish McTighe, The 
Haptic Aesthetic in Samuel Beckett’s Drama (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013); and S.E  Gontarski, ‘Samuel Beckett in the Idea of Theatre’, in The New 
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these critics, all of whom are influenced, in one way or another, by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze, the significance of Beckett’s theatre is not 
found in making us think, but in making us feel, in how it challenges dominant 
models of knowledge, perception and perspective. McTighe, for instance, points 
out that, ‘“haptic” in Beckett’s work does not only indicate contact and 
connection, it also describes disruption of space, time, and bodies, imaged in the 
formal structures that surround them’. 28And in the ‘Introduction’ to Performing 
Embodiment in Samuel Beckett’s Drama, McMullan states that: 
In an era in which commodified and technologized visual culture 
disseminates phantasmatic corporealities, [Beckett’s] presentation of 
derogated, vulnerable bodies that struggle to appear and to speak 
continues to pose a challenge to contemporary culture and 
performance.29  
Although no explicit ecocritical agenda is adumbrated by any of the critics 
mentioned above, the attention they accord affect offers productive insights for 
thinking through the ecological potential inherent in Beckett’s theatre. In order, 
then, to tease out what that potential might be, and in the hope of bringing two 
different approaches to Beckett’s work into a generative alignment for the first 
time, I propose, for the remainder of this article, to read Beckett’s theatre 
metaphorically as a garden, a site where presentation is more important than 
representation and where the exceptional status of the human is placed in crisis.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. by Dirk Van Hulle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 126-42. 
28 McTighe, The Haptic Aesthetic, p. 8. 
29 McMullan, Performing Embodiment, p. 1. 
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But first, a word of caution. When I speak of exploring Beckett’s theatre 
garden, I am not concerned with biographical details (Beckett’s famous trouble 
with moles at his modest house in Ussy for example),30 and neither am I much 
interested in teasing out specific references to flowers or weather in his work, 
such, as say, in Endgame, when Hamm dreams of ‘Pomona’ and ‘Ceres’, 
somewhere ‘beyond the hills’, where it is, perhaps, ‘still green’.31 Likewise, I have 
no desire to argue for a site-specific staging of Beckett’s work in actual gardens. 
On the contrary, I am more preoccupied with reconfiguring theatre’s 
architectural function as a site or location that has been subtracted, cut out, from 
the flux and continuity of the world, and provided with walls, an enclosure of 
sorts, that would somehow mark it off from the chaos of everyday life. The point 
of this enclosure, as I see it, is not to reject or deny the world in an act of 
spurious aesthetic autonomy, but to find another way of engaging with it, of 
producing a sense of difference, an alternative spatio-temporal rhythm, perhaps. 
In Beckett’s theatre garden, theatre is no longer the space for looking; it is a 
sensorium, a space where we are affected, corporeally, by the stuff that is placed 
in it, landscaped we might even say. Finally, in contrast to Leo Marx’s The 
Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (1964),32 his 
classic study of how literature responded to industrialism’s destruction of 
pastoralism in the US in the nineteenth century, Beckett’s garden shows no 
                                                        
30 For more on Beckett’s troubles with moles and wild boars in his garden, see 
James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1997), pp. 460-61. 
31 Beckett, Endgame, p. 111. See also Winnie’s reference to ‘the back garden at 
Borough Green’ in Happy Days, p. 142. 
32 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
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nostalgia for a lost wilderness.33 Like land artist Robert Smithson, Beckett knows 
that ‘there is no escape from matter’,34 not even in the theatre, considered 
historically, as the anthropocentric medium par excellence.35 
Beckett’s Theatre Garden 
In keeping with Beckett’s famously subtractive and minimalist mode of 
theatre, the theatre garden is an idiom that can do without drama, without 
conflict, without narrative; it is a space in which nothing – or almost nothing - 
happens, a location where, as in Waiting for Godot, the only thing that grows is a 
solitary leaf on a naked tree and where  ‘everything oozes’.36 Time slows down in 
Beckett’s theatre garden, and entropy, the gradual dissipation of energy, is 
perceived through the construction of an event in which all we can do, as 
spectators, is to follow ‘something taking its course’.37 In this perpetual elapsing 
that never comes to an end, we experience what Stephen Connor has termed 
‘slow going’, a painful temporality that leaves us exiled, undone, at the mercy of 
time itself. 38In Endgame, Hamm reminds us that theatre, in so far as it is a 
temporal art, is where ‘we breathe, we change. We lose our hair, our teeth! Our 
bloom, our ideals!’.39 In the theatre garden, the abstract quality of Clov’s 
                                                        
33 For a related critique of the essentialism inherent to Marx’s garden metaphor, 
see Stephen Bottoms, ‘The Garden in the Machine: Edward Albee, Sam Shepard, 
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impossible heap is now figured as a heap of decomposing stuff, materiality that, 
as a result of the passage of time, has lost its shape, its form, but which, for all 
that, still offers the hope that a new life might begin. This is a life in which, as Joe 
Kelleher argues in an essay on Happy Days, it is enough, simply, to be there, to 
affirm one’s presence on the earth without looking for any transcendent 
meaning.40 
This ontology of stubborn naivety, this affirmation of material existence, 
is certainly how performance theorists Bonnie Marranca and Allen S. Weiss think 
about gardens. In her neglected text ‘Garden/Theater’, published originally as 
the preface to American Gardening Writing (1988), Marranca argues that of all 
the arts, theatre is the one that comes closest to gardening in the respect to 
which it leaves her ‘feeling at home in the ephemerality of time’.41 Marranca 
continues:  
Really it is not so difficult to move from a theater to a garden. Each creates 
a world in space that celebrates pure presence, and the fabulous 
confusion of nature and artifice, which is to say, reality and illusion. At 
least one half of gardening is dreaming yourself into a new setting. 42 
If we interpret ‘pure presence’ materially rather than metaphysically, then 
Marranca’s analogy is more than an abstract metaphor. For what it does is to 
establish a sensual analogy between theatre and gardening that revolves around 
how both activities structure temporality. In each instance, human operators – 
the playwright, the gardener – structure time and space in such a way that the 
                                                        
40 Joe Kelleher, ‘Recycling Beckett’, in Rethinking The Theatre of Absurd, ed. by 
Lavery and Finburgh, pp. 127-46 (p.143). 
41 Bonnie Marranca, ‘Garden/Theater’ in Ecologies of Theatre (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins, 1996), pp. 181-84 (p. 182). 
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whole focus is on cultivating an awareness of transience, in celebrating the earth 
as it is. 
Weiss proposes a similar argument in the ten points that make up his 
2013 ‘Manifesto for a Future of Landscape’. According to Weiss, in Point Seven of 
that text, ‘The garden is a hyperbolically ephemeral structure. Anachronism is of 
the essence, since a garden is all that it was and all that it shall become’.43 
Likewise in Point Nine – and in language that draws attention, quite beautifully, 
to the intimate relationship existing between theatre and gardens - Weiss 
suggests that, ‘the garden is a memory theatre, which must bear vestiges of its 
sedimented history, including traces of the catastrophes that it has suffered’.44 
For Weiss, gardens, like theatres, are instances of what Steven Connor, after 
Jean-Luc Nancy, might call ‘ radical finitude’, places which have neither meaning 
nor telos, but which simply come into being and disappear again.45 While there is 
a certain melancholy here, there is also a joy, a pleasure, a way of recognising the 
inhuman world - the oikos - that we can never know or control.  In the garden, as 
in the theatre, we cultivate strangeness and celebrate Lyotard’s ‘troublesome 
guest’ who not only imposes ‘distress’ or ‘suffering’,46 but is ‘the Fremde 
[stranger] at the source of every invention, creation, and writing’.47 
That Beckett, too, was aware of art’s capacity to cultivate a space for the 
inhuman, for disclosing that internal margin that divides us from ourselves, is 
evident in two letters he sent to Tom MacGreevy in 1934 and 1937, discussing 
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the affect produced by the paintings – the landscapes – of first Paul Cézanne and 
second Jack Yeats: 
How far Cézanne had moved from the snapshot pueriles of Manet and Cie 
when he could understand the dynamic intrusion to be himself and so 
landscape to be something by definition unapproachably alien, an 
unintelligible arrangement of atoms, not so much as ruffled by the 
Reliability Joneses.48 
What I feel he [Yeats] gets so well, dispassionately, not tragically like 
Watteau, is the heterogeneity of nature and the human denizens, the 
unalterable alienness of the 2 phenomena, the 2 solitudes, or the solitude 
and loneliness, the loneliness in solitude, the impassable immensity 
between the solitude that cannot quicken to loneliness and the loneliness 
that cannot lapse into solitude.49 
For Beckett, the experience of landscape that Cézanne and Yeats provide 
is not an experience of identification or reconciliation with ‘nature’, and neither 
it is an attempt to ‘improve it’ by reducing it to human scale, as Capability Brown, 
the eighteenth century English landscape gardener, sought to do. (In Beckett’s 
letter, the reference to the ‘Reliability Jones’ is, of course, a sarcastic pun on 
Capability Brown.) On the contrary, we gain, for Beckett, a more accurate, non-
sentimental experience of the land through artworks that are deliberately 
stylized and formally experimental. This is because, Beckett implies, such work 
recalibrates our vision, and allows us to catch a glimpse into what the Canadian 
poet Lisa Robertson refers to as ‘inexplicable opacity’.50 If we can claim, as Lois 
Oppenheim does, that Beckett’s theatre aesthetic is informed as much by fine art 
practice as by writing, then to be in Beckett’s theatre garden, is not to inhabit 
some illusory, mimetic garden, but to be made aware of the unapproachably 
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alien quality of existence itself, to be left non-reconciled.51 Importantly, though, 
and in reference to my earlier point about medium specificity, Beckett discloses 
the alien presence of the inhuman in his theatre garden by producing a rhythm, 
creating a tempo, that slows perception down to the point where things and 
experiences that ordinarily go unnoticed are allowed to impress themselves 
upon us. In the process, we are weathered in the same way as the three 
anonymous characters that are trapped in the urns in Play (1963). We, too, have 
been enfolded in the temporal fabric of the work, attuned to a time of ‘dis-
appointment’ that is always too slow or too late for consciousness. 
The Time of the Spectator 
In his article ‘Godotology: There’s Lots of Time in Godot’, Richard 
Schechner shows how Beckett establishes two rhythms, ‘one of the play and one 
of the stage’.52 Whereas the rhythm of the play concerns the relationship 
between playwright, directors and actors, the rhythm of the stage is the 
metatheatrical rhythm that includes the audience in its duration. Schechner’s 
point about audience inclusion is underlined by both Jonathan Kalb and Steven 
Connor. For Kalb, Beckett’s aim – and this is an avant-garde aim - is to make the 
spectator aware of ‘immediacy’, the sense in which the time of the performance 
is the performance of now, something that goes beyond mere representation.53 
According to Connor, the goal is similar but different. By including us in the 
performance, Beckett does not so much make us present as absent, revealing our 
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own inability to be on time, to coincide with the performance. In his reading of 
That Time (1976), Connor concentrates on the final words of the play ‘no time 
gone in no time’, and argues that the audience, too, has participated in a ‘stretch 
of “no-time”, that is, the “non-time” of the dramatic representation, in which 
there is no real before or after, or even present tense, but only the 
representations of them’. 54 However, Connor is careful to caution that this ‘non-
time’ is not a time of entertainment or illusion that will end once the 
performance has terminated. Rather for Connor, ‘we may also feel for a moment 
the anxiety that this theatrical “no-time” is more like our own lived time…than 
we care to, or can afford to, believe’.55  
 But how is this ‘anxious no-time’ constructed in Beckett’s theatre garden? 
In what ways can it be seen as ecological?  And how to write it? Since so much 
has already been written about Godot and Endgame, I intend to answer these 
questions by concentrating on Footfalls, one of Beckett’s short, later pieces, 
which, on the surface at least, would appear to have little to do either with 
ecology or gardens. However, as I disclose below, this reluctance to represent is 
precisely what ties Footfalls so forcibly to the world, the very thing that provides 
actual experience of what it means to live in time. One final point or disclaimer: 
there is nothing special in choosing Footfalls to demonstrate my argument – 
most of Beckett’s dramaticules would have served my purpose equally well. 
Written in 1975, Footfalls, like all of Beckett’s dramaticules, defies 
meaning and resists hermeneutic parsing. The audience is presented with a 
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strikingly sparse stage image – a middle-aged women, with ‘dishevelled grey 
hair’,56 dressed in a tattered lace gown paces up and down on an illuminated 
strip in a darkened space, listening to the low, slow voice of her Mother (V) that 
has been pre-recorded and broadcast over a speaker system.57 Throughout the 
performance one is never quite sure why May (M) is there, and the question, 
ultimately, is never resolved. There is neither back-story nor dénouement. 
Indeed, as the play unfolds, according to its own glacial pace and staccato 
rhythm, our confusion only increases, as we can no longer ascertain, with any 
certainty, the nature of the relationship between the two women, voice and body, 
Mother and daughter. In the opening section of the performance, for instance, 
and despite the strangeness of the situation, a reflective or figurative logic just 
about holds. For here it is possible to understand the voice as a kind of auditory 
hallucination, a dialogue in the head, a phantasmatic Mother dreamt up by May 
as a kind of succour, a ghostly companion to aid her in her endless pacing, her 
insomniac inability to remain still. 
V: Will you never have done? [Pause.] Will you never have 
done…revolving it all? 
M. [Halting.] It? 
V: It all [Pause.]. In your poor mind. [Pause.]. It all [Pause.]. It all.58 
 
 Our attempts to make sense of the initial situation that we are presented 
with in Footfalls are thrown into doubt, however, in the second section of the 
piece, when dialogue ends and monologue takes over. While May continues, 
albeit at a reduced rhythm, to pace her small corridor of light, the acousmatic 
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voice of the Mother attains a kind of autonomy, and provides some oblique 
information - but it is hardly much -  into May’s condition: 
V: See how still she stands, how stark, with her face to the wall. [Pause.] 
How outwardly unmoved. [Pause.] She has not been out since girlhood. 
[Pause.] Not since girlhood. [Pause.] Where is she, it may be asked. 
[Pause.] Why in the old home, the same where she – [Pause.] Where it 
began. [Pause.] It all began. [Pause.] …When other girls of her age were 
out at…lacrosse, she was already here. [Pause]. At this….59 
The shift from dialogue to monologue explodes dramatic conventions. It is 
impossible, now, to grasp, fully, the situation we are confronted with.  For if the 
opening section still corresponded to a kind of reality, albeit an hallucinatory 
one, the voice’s investment in narrative, along with her direct address to the 
audience, forecloses such a conventional, if understandable reading of events in 
the play. Henceforth, there is nothing representational about the voice, and it 
cannot be accorded a place within a standard dramatic paradigm. Rather the 
voice is free-floating, something that we have to accept for what it is, as opposed 
to what it might mean. In Footfalls, the causal logic of both Aristotelian and 
Brechtian dramaturgy is undone. In its place, Beckett, close to both Symbolism 
and Surrealism, asks us to accept a different stage, a theatre that has given up on 
reflecting a world that we supposedly know, and where people and objects 
retreat and retain their mystery. 
 The mysteriousness of Footfalls is compounded in the final movement of 
the piece, when the recorded voice of the Mother disappears and the embodied 
voice of May takes over for what she calls the ‘sequel’: 
M:…Sequel. A little later when she was quite forgotten, she began to – 
[Pause.] A little later, when as though she had never been, it never been, 
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she began to walk. [Pause.] At nightfall. [Pause.] Slip out at nightfall and 
into the little church by the north door….60   
As in Rockaby (1981), Not I and That Time, May’s use of the third person 
pronoun deliberately blurs the space between subject and object, agent and 
recipient. We no longer know if May is referring to herself, her Mother, or to 
some other. Everything is as indeterminate and hazy as the ‘semblance’ that May 
purports to see in the churchyard at moonlight. Then, in a speech that both 
repeats and varies the structure of the Mother’s monologue, May, as if from 
nowhere, and appearing, bizarrely, to assume some prior knowledge on the 
spectator’s part, introduces a new fiction, narrates a different story: 
M: Old Mrs Winter, whom the reader will remember, old Mrs Winter, one 
late autumn Sunday evening, on sitting down to super with her daughter 
after worship, after a few half-hearted mouthfuls laid down her knife and 
fork, and bowed her head. What is it, Mother, said the daughter, a most 
strange girl, though scarcely a girl any more….61 
Typically, the strange incident recounted by May is elliptical and unfinished. At 
its core, there is an absence, a gap, something that refuses to appear: 
M: Amy, did you observe anything strange at Evensong? Amy: no Mother, 
I did not. Mrs W: Perhaps it just my fancy. Amy: Just what exactly, Mother, 
did you perhaps fancy it was? [Pause.] Just what exactly, Mother, did you 
perhaps fancy it was? [Pause]…Mrs W: You yourself observed 
nothing…strange? Amy: No, Mother, I myself did not, to put it mildly…For 
I observed nothing of any kind, strange or otherwise. I saw nothing, heard 
nothing, of any kind, I was not there. Mrs W: Not there? Amy: Not there. 
Mrs W: But I heard you respond. [Pause.] I heard you say Amen….62 
The story of Mrs Winters and her daughter, Amy (an anagram of May), 
has a performative function. It adds an additional layer of opacity to the play we 
are watching. Not only because the story’s strangeness reflects the strangeness 
of the situation of Footfalls itself, but because it complicates further the 
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relationship between May and her Mother. The very last lines of May’s narrative, 
for example, are the same as those uttered by the Mother at the very start of the 
play: 
M: Amy. [Pause. No louder.] Amy. [Pause.] Yes, Mother. [Pause.] Will you 
never have done? [Pause.] Will you never have done…revolving it all? 
[Pause.] It? [Pause.] It all. [Pause.] In your poor mind. [Pause.] It all. 
[Pause.] It all.63  
The narratalogical shifts, refrains and allusions in the play prevent us 
from assigning meaning. There is simply no point in trying to work out who May 
and the Mother are and/or what the status of their relationship is, be that 
phantasmatic or fictional. Rather Beckett has done his utmost to present us with 
a situation that we must, if we want to respond to the performance, accept at 
face value. In Footfalls, what is important is not the narrative or story, but the 
rhythmic construction of the piece, the way in which it works as a totality, 
impressing itself upon us, entangling us in strangeness, in ‘it all’.64 
Things, of course, are even more complex when one moves from the play 
text to the performance text. In the physical unfolding of the piece, the mystery 
of the narrative is only one aspect of the work, something that rumbles away in 
background, existing at the very edges of consciousness. To watch Footfalls, as 
opposed to reading it, is to be caught in an immediate mood of melancholy, to be 
enveloped in the ambience of the piece, affected by the shuffling sounds of May’s 
footsteps, the brilliance of the lights, the darkness of the shadows, the grain of 
the voice, and the tangled tatters of the dress, its fragility. Meaning here is not 
communicated by words, but by the radiance of things, or perhaps more 





accurately by Beckett’s ability to produce what we might call, after David 
Williams, a ‘rhythmed assemblage’ , that is, a non-linear form of dramaturgy  that 
includes the audience in its movement, as it makes its contingent and gratuitous 
passage across time and space.65 According to Williams, dramaturgy as 
‘rhythmed assemblage’ is characterised by intensities, atmospheres, and 
emotions: the aim is to produce significance through a kind of corporeal ‘touch’, 
not through deciphering abstract signs. 
Beckett’s ability to create a performance that simultaneously includes the 
audience in its pulse and beat, is what makes his late plays properly 
environmental, that is to say, works in which we inhabit a world as opposed to 
simply looking at one that we already know. In the world of Footfalls, as we 
might also experience in a garden, actors are no longer human representatives 
that we identify with or know at the level of empathetic engagement or 
psychological recognition. Rather, they are things in themselves, objects that 
retain a sense of discreteness, and that serve no other purpose than their own 
being there. In that respect, Footfalls is not an abstract performance (as one 
might conventionally find it described), but a decidedly materialist one. Our 
inability to get behind the surface of the characters, to know and understand 
them, sensitises us to the play and sheen of surfaces, which, by the very fact of 
being brought into appearance, overflow their discreteness and start to work 
upon our senses, affecting us, pulling us into the world of things. In Footfalls, as 
in Beckett’s other dramaticules, visual perception is no longer something that 
                                                        
65 David Williams, ‘Geographies of Requiredness: Notes on the Dramaturg in 




moves out conically from the eye; on the contrary, it is something that moves 
inwards from the impress of the world, from the ability of matter to move us and 
so transform our modes of perceiving and thus operating in/on the earth. 
 Beckett’s sculpting of time is crucial to his theatre of affect. Whereas 
dramatic theatre always seeks to deny its own immersion in time, to transcend 
the present by investing in narratives that would entertain us and so make us 
forget our painful grounding in the temporal, Beckett prefers to glue us to the 
present, allowing us to feel the passage of time itself in our bodies. In Footfalls, 
Beckett achieves this by investing in a logic of deceleration, slowing things down 
so that what is ordinarily imperceptible – the sound of shuffling feet, the swish of 
a wrap, the depth of shadows – is brought into consciousness. This slowing down 
of time does not allow us dominion over the moving surfaces that pass before 
our eyes by sharpening our attention and honing powers of concentration. On 
the contrary, deceleration ‘speeds things up’, attuning us to the different speeds 
and intensities of the multiple things of the performance. Slowness here disturbs 
us, prevents us from sitting still. We are enervated and irritated: the 
performance resists; it produces friction and retains its autonomy. We are 
unable to dominate it. It escapes our desire to petrify it into meaning, to hold it in 
our gaze. 
In Footfalls, the constant pausing of the voice, along with the interrupted 
pacing of May, gives rise to a syncopated rhythm. The performance draws us in 
only to thrust us back, to leave us shipwrecked somewhere in the middle of a 
beat. Like the slowness of the performance, the unevenness of the rhythm 
prevents you from losing yourself in an object, from becoming one with it. You 
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connect and disconnect, advance and retreat, find yourself on a constantly 
shifting margin. In the same way that perception in a garden moves from one 
object to another without being captured and captivated by any one thing, so 
Beckett, in his theatre garden, is always concerned to disrupt spectatorial 
experience, to prevent it from being absorbed completely in the work. The point 
of this disruption, this désoeuvrement of what theatre should supposedly be, is to 
allow a space for the appearance of what most theatre is unable to bear: the 
boring, the banal, the thing that refuses to signify – the oikos. 
The spatial conventions of theatre play an important part in Beckett’s 
desire to produce ecological affect. Unlike durational video works that today are 
shown everywhere in the white cubes of art galleries, Beckett’s garden theatre is 
located within a black box. You have to go through the performance, to sit with it, 
to find a way of dealing with its dilation of our habitual temporal frame. That is 
where – that is how - it works best, as a kind of ‘forced entertainment’, we might 
say.  In theatre, there is no way you can stop the performance, walk away, talk 
with someone else, exit the space, if it all becomes too much. This is time as 
endurance, in the double sense of that word – both time that escapes 
measurement, as in Henri Bergson’s concept of durée, but also painful time, time 
without transcendence, or, what amounts to the same thing, time without the 
consolation of distraction.66  In Beckett’s theatre garden, as in Endgame, there is, 
as Hamm says, ‘nothing on the horizon’, no vista to move towards.67 You are 
always rooted to the spot, to the impossible here and now.  
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It is no coincidence that the word dominating Footfalls is ‘it’, a pronoun 
for some unspeakable absence, a signifier of impossibility. The ‘it’ here is the 
same ‘it’ we find in French constructions such as il y a (there is), and il est temps 
(it is time). What this ‘it’ designates in Footfalls is the impersonal, ungraspable 
quality of time itself. The ‘it’ of the oikos, the ‘it’ that we don’t want to admit to or 
experience, because we can’t inhabit or possess it. ‘It’ is inhuman, impossible, it 
serves only to point out our difference; our failure to do anything else but ‘to 
revolve’, like May, around some empty centre. Nothing to be done in the vicinity 
of the ‘it’, this time beyond human time, this time that punctures mastery, this 
time where we intuit mortality, the necessary disappearance of things. 
In this affirmation of transience, this cultivation of time, we find another 
parallel between Beckett’s theatre and the art of gardening. According to Daniel 
Charles, ‘the moss’ that covers the rocks in the Zen Garden at Ryoan-Ji, in Kyoto, 
is the very thing that allows ‘the place [to] cultivate and abandon itself to 
forgetfulness as a vital force, as the very force of time’.68 For Charles, moss is an 
ambivalent and deconstructive signifier, in so far as its ‘work consists, in the very 
same movement, of affirming and annulling’. 69 In the stony ground of Beckett’s 
theatre garden, the things in Footfalls (lights, human bodies, clothes, voices) 
might be seen as kinds of moss or lichen that insist on their opacity, not simply at 
the level of signs, but at the level of experience, in their production of a time, an 
‘it’ that simultaneously beckons us in and ejects us in the same moment. In this 
‘it’, we feel discomfited, distracted by our attention, and attentive through 
                                                                                                                                                              
 




distraction. We are impoverished by ‘it’, simultaneously affirmed and annulled. 
In this garden, we feel what we might call ‘the weight of the world’, a strange sort 
of gravity that always places a barrier, a shadow, between us and things. 
Although we do not pace the boards, we, the spectators, ultimately, share May’s 
predicament in Footfalls. We too, inhabit the shadowland, sit in the dark and 
experience the impossibility of escaping the world, of being unable to extricate 
ourselves from a narrow strip of light. 
Ironically, though, it is here, in this inescapability, that the ecological 
meaning of Beckett’s theatre resides. Its ability to remind us of the oikos, along 
with its capacity for instigating a corporeal and affective process, bears witness 
to everything that human beings, with their metaphysical obsessions with exiting 
the world, strive to repress and escape. Whereas environmentalist thinkers 
speak of changing recycling habits, of learning to adapt to a system that might 
delay the catastrophe, Beckett shows us what might emerge if we accept that the 
worst has already happened and that there is no solution to the ecological crisis. 
In this moment of ontological weakness and lameness, this acceptance that 
everything is already exhausted, a different kind of knowledge emerges. Here the 
oikos is no longer pushed away, forgotten, dispelled; it is admitted, allowed to 
exist, given a space to appear. Typically, Beckett offers neither explanation nor 
resolution for the appearance of this marginal other, this troublesome guest, so 
intimate in/to us that it always escapes our clutches. It is simply there as a 
‘strange stranger’, as something we can’t incorporate, a left over, an excessive 
remainder.70 But the fact that the other is not only acknowledged, but affirmed in 
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Footfalls, is the very thing that allows Beckett’s play, I would argue, to hold out a 
sense of ecological hope. Crucially, though, no scenario is sketched out, no 
representation of what that hope might look like. On the contrary, the future is 
placed on hold, freeze-framed, stilled.  But it is here in this stilling that the future, 
to use a French word so dear to Jacques Derrida, is posited as un avenir, a future 
that we won’t ever know or be able to control, because like the oikos itself, it is 
always to a-venir, to come, a time, then, that eludes consciousness, cognition and 
capture, a time that is marginal.71 
 The theory of ecology that I am proposing in this article is difficult. I 
understand that is has nothing to say about the decisions that face us now with 
respect to the ecological crisis we are in, and which might well worsen in the 
years to come. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if we are to live differently on 
the earth, then another mode of being, an alternative form of thinking is 
necessary. This will not be done by fetishising nature or by looking for moments 
of harmony and balance. On the contrary, it is more important to explore 
moments of ontological difficulty and conflict that, as I suspect, will be 
impossible to resolve or transcend. However, it seems crucial that we at least 
acknowledge this impossibility as a basis for action, as a limit or ballast against 
the Promethean hubris of ecological problem solving. Indeed, it might even be 
that the failure of a solution might ameliorate things by giving rise to more 
humble or ‘weaker’ ways of being human.72 As I have tried to argue in this article, 
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by creating a theatre garden where we are undone in and by time, deposed and 
dispossessed on the earth, Beckett’s theatre leaves us as helpless and 
indeterminate ‘as a little bit of grit in the middle of the steppe’ that knows not 
where its future will be.73 For me, this is what gardening with Beckett does, and 
is precisely the reason why his theatre exists as an ecological practice, something 
that allows you to live according to a different rhythm, in which humans and 
non-humans are caught in the vast and paradoxical endlessness of time’s eternal 
transience.  
In addition to changing our conceptions about where the ecological 
charge of Beckett’s theatre resides, I hope that the garden analogy I have 
advanced in this article will have wider implications for the discipline of Theatre 
Studies in general. To suggest that theatre be approached as a garden challenges 
the engrained anthropocentrism of the medium itself, the sense in which theatre 
has always been regarded as the privileged domain of the human, the place in 
which audiences and performers come together to reflect on pressing social and 
political issues.  Thinking of theatre as a garden rather than a house, however, 
discloses what most forms of theatre practice and criticism have tended to 
repress, if not actively foreclose: namely, that the human actor on stage is always 
already a part of ‘nature’. If we accept an expanded view of ecology in which 
‘nature’ and culture form part of a shared world, then there is no need to 
abandon the artifice of the auditorium or black box for a site-based or immersive 
aesthetic that would supposedly get us closer to the environment by situating 
itself within nature, as some of our most innovative ecocritics in Theatre Studies 
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would have us do.74 Much better and more progressive, I think, to reconsider the 
black box as a type of garden, a site where everything and everyone is already 
‘nature’, albeit with different capacities and possibilities. In the theatre garden to 
look is to be touched, to be affected corporeality by the materiality of the 
performance itself 
To think of theatre as a garden advances, in and by itself, an alternative 
view of the human subject, one that is line in with Beckett’s and Lyotard’s 
conviction that the human is constituted by the inhuman, haunted by the animal 
in the very heart of its so-called exceptional identity. In the theatre garden, the 
human is no longer portrayed as an exception to the world, a hero who can use 
rationality, will and language to transcend time and space. Rather, the actors and 
spectators who together make up the performance event are shown to be 
material organisms, whose modes of perception and ways of thinking are bound 
up with the physical processes of a planet that they cannot escape or master. In 
my attempts to imagine Beckett’s theatre as a garden, I have attempted to argue 
for a way of doing ecology that, to borrow from Gilles Deleuze’s writings on 
cinema, might allow us ‘to discover and restore belief in the world, before or 
beyond words’.75 Importantly, though, the theatre garden makes this affirmation 
of the world not through the movement of images on a screen, as Deleuze 
                                                        
74 See Baz Kershaw, Theatre Ecology: Environments and Performance Events 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2007), pp. 314-18; and Stephen Bottoms’ 
research project ‘Reflecting on Environmental Change Through Site-Based 
Performance’ (2010-3), http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/projects?ref=AH/H03921X/1 
(accessed 18 April 2017). At its most basic, the argument here is that black box 
theatre separates us from the environment by producing subjects who merely 
look at nature as a spectacle, and so have no corporeal or material relationship 
with it. 
75 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and 
Robert Galeta (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 172. 
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proposes, but through the shared co-presence of bodies living and dying together 
in an actual space-time enclosure, in the unfolding of something irreversible and 
inhuman – the cultivation of the oikos. 
 
Abstract  
This article seeks to offer a new way of engaging with the ecological potential of 
Beckett’s theatre by approaching it, metaphorically, as a theatre garden. In doing 
so, it brings together, for the first time, two disparate trends in Beckett’s 
scholarship – the ecocritical and haptic – and argues for an ecology grounded in 
affect and temporality. While many of Beckett’s works are mentioned in the 
article, special attention is given to the short play Footfalls, which is presented as 
a work where the oikos or what Jean-François Lyotard terms ‘the troublesome 
guest’ is allowed a space to emerge. As well as arguing for an alternative form of 
ecology, the decision to read Beckett’s theatre through the figure or trope of the 
garden is motivated by an attempt to question the so-called anthropocentric 
basis of the theatre medium in general and, more specifically, to find a mode of 
writing able to capture and express the ‘ecological affect’ of Beckett’s plays in 
performance. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
